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In September, 1993, the President, Vice President, and the leaders of Chrysler, Ford, and
General Motors announced an ambitious joint initiative targeted to tripling automotive fuel
efficiency within the next decade. Variously called the Clean Car Initiative, Super Car
Program, or Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), this collaborative
effort will be led by an interagency team on the government side and by USCAR on the
industry side. We welcome the opportunity to comment on the goals of this effort and to
suggest issues that we feel must be considered as the pursuit of an environmentally more
efficient vehicle moves forward. We will first make some general observations, then turn
to a few of the specific issues the Committee has identified for discussion.
We would like to stress at the outset of our remarks that we applaud this initiative and
strongly endorse its overall goals. We are particularly pleased that this effort shows
evidence of true cooperation between industry and government in pursuit of sound policy
objectives, improved fuel economy and a cleaner environment, or what our economist
friends would call social goods. Such cooperation should confer a number of benefits.
First, it should foster the development of appropriately balanced goals. Cooperative effort
should ensure that the needs and preferences of both the automotive industry and society
are considered and optimized simultaneously. This increases the probability that decisions
will be made that properly reflect the complexity of the system that underpins our
transportation use and vehicle production. In our view, regulation of the industry has all
too frequently been narrowly conceived, often without full consideration of all of the
consequences of the actions of the numerous agencies that oversee important different
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aspects of industry activity. This has too often resulted in suboptimization at the total
system level. For example, while one might reasonably argue that the costs of regulations
targeted to safety, fuel efficiency, and clean air are all individually justified, their combined
costs have driven up the price of cars by a substantial amount, slowing sales and thus the
retirement of older vehicles in the fleet. Consideration of these regulations as a package
might well have yielded initiatives that conferred greater environmental benefits to society at
lower cost to consumers, while allowing the companies to pursue other necessary
investments.
Second, cooperation is likely to promote the efficient use of resources to achieve those
goals. Coordinated, cooperative effort should avoid duplicative and wasteful attempts by
both industry and government, or by companies within the industry, in pursuit of the same
solutions, while encouraging the exploration of alternative solutions. Industry analysts are
still puzzled by the requirement in the 1970s that each of the Big Three independently
pursue technologies to meet mandated emission requirements. The catalytic converter soon
emerged from General Motor's Technical Center, as analysts expected, but alter significant
expenditures by AMC, Chrysler, and Ford.
Third, cooperation decreases the likelihood that the selected means will have unintended
negative side effects for either the industry or society. The Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards undoubtedly provided the stimulus to the vastly improved fuel
economy of today's cars. However, it did nothing to alter consumer preference for fuel
efficiency, a preference that temporarily surged during the oil shocks of the 1970s, but
quickly subsided to its historic low levels. Thus the domestic industry faced enormous
investments to downsize vehicles, reconfigure driveirains, and redesign engines to meet
CAFE standards—investments with little market value. Meanwhile, they faced serious
challenges from foreign manufacturers on performance dimensions of more significance to
consumers, such as quality, reliability, and styling. Moreover, those manufacturers' home
governments had long provided consumer incentives for fuel efficiency, resulting in more
fuel efficient fleets, so CAFE standards imposed no constraints on them. The investments
required by CAFE harmed the market competitiveness of domestic manufacturers during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, and surely contributed to delaying until recently their
competitive revival. Carefully crafted, staged increases in fuel taxes could have achieved
fuel conservation goals and avoided competitive damage to the domestic industry.
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We are not naive "cooperationists," believing that industry and government can or should
seek an absolute identity of interests across all economic, political, and social domains.
Rather, we believe that these important institutions of our society must shift their historic
adversarial stances, recognizing that areas of common as well as conflicting interests exist.
The United Auto Workers and the Big Three are making a similar transition. They have
recognized identical interests in some areas, and are successfully working together on those
issues. Yet they still bargain hard over the legitimately conflicting interests and goals that
will probably always characterize management-union relationships. They have learned to
cooperate in some areas, and to contest in others, and both sides have rejected the "all-or-
nothing" approach that often characterized the past.
We fully expect that conflicts will emerge as the details of the PNGV program emerge and
take shape, but are confident that such obstacles can be reasonably resolved. Our Office
has been deeply involved over the years in cooperative efforts, both within the industry and
between the industry and state government. Such endeavors are rarely easy, but they can
be extremely successful when both sides approach them with a problem-solving orientation
and a commitment to seeking win-win solutions.
We also believe that PNGV can benefit from the technical contributions of both the
companies and the various governmental agencies and the National Labs, the companies'
marketing experience, and the government's expertise in policy means to achieve social
goals. We think it is critical for the survival of joint efforts such as PNGV that both parties
contribute and benefit. If the costs are perceived to be severely imbalanced. or the benefits
one-sided, then the efforts will often deteriorate and lose momentum.
As we understand it PNGV includes three broad objectives:
1. Developing advanced manufacturing techniques to enhance the U.S. industry's
competitiveness by more effective and efficient processes and reduced lead time
required to deliver new products to domestic and international markets;
2. Developing technologies to support near-term improvement in automobile fuel
efficiency, emissions, and safely; and
.V Undertaking research to support the development of production prototypes that
triple the fuel efficiency of today's vehicles.
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These are broad objectives indeed, and some might believe them too broad. However, our
general reaction is that these PNGV objectives address appropriately broad targets for
industry-government cooperation, and we are heartened by their development to date. In
particular, our experience in automotive research, ranging from technical refinements in
engines to international comparisons of fundamental competitiveness suggests two
important lessons. First, objectives for ambitious programs ought not to be frozen too
early. Rather, they should be kept fluid enough to respond to new information, concerns,
and realities. Such flexibility often yields better results than the original objectives could
even envision. Second, a systems approach to automotive issues is absolutely essential.
The vehicle and the industry are each too complex and interdependent to permit ready and
easy separation of issues for consideration in isolation. This is particularly the case when
the long term objective calls for sweeping and fundamental change, and that is certainly the
case here.
Some might say these goals are too optimistic and simply not reachable. After all, it took
the industry over ten years to double its vehicles' fuel efficiency under the pressure of
CAFE standards, and those early gains were in many senses easier and more readily
available than the gains required for a tripling of fuel efficiency over the coming ten years.
This view certainly has merit, but we believe the goal of tripling fuel efficiency is a
reasonable target. To be sure, we arc not absolutely certain that PNGV can reach it, nor do
we have a crystal clear idea of how one would best attempt to reach it. But in general we
believe in "stretch" goals, those that take one beyond the realm of the familiar and well-
understood, and spur creativity and innovation. While there certainly is a high risk of
failing, there is some chance for achieving the goal. In our view, goals completely
reasonable and reachable with today's technology offer little hope of the breakthrough
technologies necessary for substantial improvement in fuel efficiency.
Again, we emphasize that we are here considering goals, our views of the appropriateness
of these targets as mandates with penalties lor nonattainment. would be quite different.
Thus the California LEV/ZEV effort is a mandate that makes little sense to us. and we are
confident will be rejected by consumers once they experience its consequences. In
contrast, we see PNGV as providing incentives for the development of appropriate and
effective technology, not forcing the deployment of vehicles whose excellence on one
performance dimension is massively underwritten b\ inadequate performance on so many
others.
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The automotive industry increasingly has adopted a philosophy of continuous
improvement, calling for it to make frequent, small changes that can cumulate to substantial
changes over time. This philosophy has been forced on the industry by the realities of day-
to-day competition and an increasingly demanding and sophisticated consumer. In the
past, the industry tended to store up possible changes in process and product, and then
tried to implement them as a package at the time of annual model change or at the
introduction of a new vehicle. This approach ultimately encouraged a view of improvement
that came to ignore the small steps and prized approaches that promised quantum leaps. In
reality, of course, both kinds of change are important, and effective change strategies
require both. That is why so many companies today pursue both continuous improvement
and "business process reengineering," the current term for radical or leap-frog
improvement strategies.
We see the near term goals of the second objective as essentially a continuous improvement
strategy in the fuel efficiency arena, calling for the development of a wide range of
technologies that will improve the environmental performance of the vehicle. Most of these
technologies will likely be minor refinements and improvements on the existing base. On
the other hand, the third objective clearly calls for a technical leap, a breakthrough approach
to improvement. We think this combination of efforts makes sense, since the incremental
approach will probably provide some measure of improvement while we pursue the
admittedly less likely breakthrough. Unfortunately, there are no quick fixes available to
achieve the goals laid out by PNGV.
However, we arc less comfortable that the third objective specifically calls for developing a
production prototype vehicle. We think efforts under the third objective would better focus
on the specific barrier technologies, such as the batteries necessary for a market acceptable
and effective electric vehicle, hybrid powertrains. and advanced—and manufacturable—
composites structures. Our concern is that effort will be diverted to developing the vehicle
itself, rather than its key enabling technologies. In our view, the vehicle itself may be
much less of a problem, and can be readily developed once the underlying necessary
technology exists. The breakthrough effort requires laser-like precision in targeting those
key enabling technologies, and must also avoid the politicization of the technical effort.
This program must be driven by the need to develop and exploit world class technical and
competitive capability, not by other criteria, such as job creation, however laudable such
goals may be.
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We are especially pleased to see the emphasis the first objective places on manufacturing
techniques. Manufacturing is a key step in successful commercialization of any
technologies developed or advanced under the PNGV effort, and it as an important element
of the overall effort to achieve competitiveness. We have long argued that to the extent that
the U.S. industry has faced competitive disadvantages in the technology arena compared to
their major international competitors, the Japanese industry, that disadvantage has primarily
been one of process rather than product technology. Moreover, the disadvantage in
process technology has been concentrated far more in the softer, linking technologies—or
techniques—of overall process layout, control, and efficiency rather than in the focused,
hard technologies of the actual production machinery.
The entire product development process, from initial idea to the car on the dealer's lot, can
benefit from focused efforts to improve manufacturing and design techniques. In fact, we
would suggest that this objective might be broadened to encompass not just manufacturing
techniques, but also the broader engineering, design, and management techniques that
encompass all the business and organizational processes required to deliver a vehicle to
market more quickly.
We also believe that it is important to recognize at the outset that the time constant in change
equations for the automotive industry is very large. The size and complexity of the
industry, combined with the complexity of the vehicle and the competitiveness of the
market simply means that the industry realistically requires more time to implement
substantial change than do smaller industries producing less complex products, often for
less competitive markets. Battleships in heavy seas do indeed require more time to change
course than speedboats on calm lakes. Perhaps none are more impatient for rapid change
than the members of the industry themselves, but the past twenty years have amply
demonstrated that trying to accelerate the pace of change beyond a feasible rate virtually
always leads to slower change than more realistic schedules. Forcing the pace of change
can lead to overlooking or only partially accomplishing important elements of the change
effort, and often fosters resistance to the change itself.
For many years now our Office has published biennial technical forecasts for the
automotive industry based on the views of technical experts both inside and outside the
industry A recurring pattern in those results suggests another important caution in
evaluating the pace of change led by PNGV: the time lapse between a technology's
development and its commercially viable deployment is typically longer than we anticipate.
Our experts rather consistently (although not always) overestimate the deployment rate of
newer technologies. Quite simply, the process of taking a working technology from the
development stage to commercial acceptance often requires additional major investments of
capital, effort, and time. Technical feasibility does not automatically and readily convert to
commercial success, and one cannot simply throw the technology over the wall and hope it
succeeds. That transition must be carefully managed to maximize acceptance.
We tum now to some of the specific issues raised by the Committee. We interpret the first
and fifth issues as both focused on the general question of the balance of the PNGV's
objectives, its particular stress on fuel economy, and how this should relate to other vehicle
performance criteria. As we suggested in our general remarks, we feel it is absolutely
critical that vehicle improvement on a targeted dimension not be achieved at the expense of
markedly decreased performance on other dimensions, including the important market
factor of price. The automotive industry simply must respond to an appropriate balance of
consumer demands, and, unfortunately, fuel economy ranks as an important purchasing
criteria only in the price-sensitive entry level segment.
Elevating consumer concern for fuel economy is a daunting challenge. In 1974, the
domestic fleet averaged 13.2 miles per gallon (mpg). By 1991, that average had risen to
27.3 mpg, so consumers driving 15,(XX) miles per year used nearly 6(K) gallons less fuel a
year, saving about $1.50 a day in gasoline purchases at $ 1.00 a gallon. However, another
improvement of 14.1 mpg would save fewer than 200 additional gallons of fuel, and, at
$1.00 a gallon, the consumer would spend about 50 cents a day less for gasoline. We
believe that dramatic escalation in fuel economy is required to make fuel economy a more
important purchase criteria. From that view, the stretch goal of tripling the 27.3 level
makes sense, although it still will still save consumers only $1.00 a day in the above
example. The fundamental question remains: will consumers base vehicle purchases on
fuel economy when fuel is so inexpensive that its marginal effect on operating costs is
probably unnoticeable to most Americans''
In contrast, safety is an increasingly important consumer criteria, as evidenced by
consumers' willingness to pay for safely equipment such as airbags and antilock braking
systems. (By the way, these are two technologies whose commercial deployment was not
overestimated by our Delphi experts t However, if salety is valued by consumers, then we
would expect the automotive companies to expand and stretch their own research in this
area, so perhaps it need not be a major focus of the PNGV, although safety should function
as an important constraint
The critical issue here is one of balance. The CAFE experience should have taught us that
focused improvements in areas of low consumer concern that are achieved by surrendering
performance in areas of high consumer concern are ineffective. They will slow sales,
hurting the industry and the economy, and slow fleet turnover, delaying achievement of the
goal. This dilemma is one reason why the pursuit of breakthrough technologies for fuel
economy are particularly important: we must find ways of achieving improvements that
might be noticeable to consumers, or that come at little or no expense on other dimensions.
This calls for a breakthrough.
The second issue targets the important shift in the market from passenger cars to light duty
vehicles, such as vans, pick ups, and sport/utilities. As these vehicles grow in popularity,
they play a significantly increasing role in overall fleet performance. We are unsure what
the appropriate research goals for these vehicles should be, but believe they probably must
be somewhat different than passenger car goals. A major rationale for distinguishing these
vehicles is their different use patterns. Pick ups, for example, have a different shape,
reflecting the type, size, and weight they often carry. Moreover, pick ups are subject to
great variation in load, as they might haul a heavy load of dirt one day and a shovel the
next. We think the research goals must be sensitive to these differences.
The third issue addresses the coordination of research efforts to meet the California
LEV/ZEV mandates and the PNGV goals, and here we simply lack the information to make
an intelligent evaluation.
The fourth issue addresses the roles appropriate to different government agencies, and we
have little specific to recommend here, since others are certainly more qualified to discuss
the issue. However, we feel that it is critical that—whatever roles are appropriate—the
actions and decisions of the various agencies be extremely well coordinated. Our work has
persuaded us that when industry meets government it is terribly important that government
speak with one voice, coordinating and rationalizing its demands and offers before
presenting them to industry.
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We also have seen too many such cooperative efforts become personalized, and success or
failure too much determined by the personalities and relationships of a few key people.
While this may be inevitable in the formative stages of such cooperation, we encourage the
participants to institutionalize the relationships as quickly as possible. Otherwise one or
two key personnel changes on either side can severely hobble the level of cooperation and
the pursuit of the program's goals.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to share these views, and would be happy to address
any questions you might care to ask.
Thank you.
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